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FISONS: WILL IT TAME THE BEAST
OF DISCOVERY ABUSE?
Barbara J. Gorham
Abstract: In WSPIEA v. Fisons, the Washington Supreme Court held that evasive and
misleading discovery tactics violate Civil Rule 26(g). This Note examines the discovery
tactics used in Fisons against the backdrop of the historic failure of courts to impose adequate
sanctions for discovery abuse. It argues that courts must do more to deter discovery abuse by
clearly articulating the requirements of the rules governing discovery, imposing severe
sanctions for discovery abuse, and closely monitoring discovery in large, complex cases.
Never give in, never give in, never, never, never, never ... except to
convictions of honor and good sense.
Sir Winston Churchill (1874-1965)
The Washington Supreme Court sent waves of shock through the
state's legal community on September 16, 1993, when it ordered
sanctions against a major drug company and its attorneys for discovery
abuse. In Washington State Physicians Insurance Exchange &
Association v. Fisons Corporation,' the court unanimously held that
evasive and misleading responses to discovery requests violate Civil
Rule 26(g), which requires judges to impose sanctions when an attorney
or client violates the letter or the spirit of the underlying discovery rules.
The court remanded the case for the imposition of sanctions and the trial
court approved a settlement in which the defendants agreed to pay a
$325,000 fine.
The mere fact that the court took action in this case is causing
litigators to reflect on discovery tactics, but the opinion itself breaks no
new ground, relying on established precedent to interpret the rule.
Instead, the significance of Fisons lies in the fact that the court is now
enforcing the discovery rules. Although this is an important first step to
curb discovery abuse, Fisons will have a lasting impact only if courts
clearly enunciate the requirements of Rule 26(g) and impose severe
sanctions for discovery abuse, instead of approving inadequate
settlements.
This Note examines Fisons against the backdrop of the historic failure
of courts to impose meaningful sanctions for discovery abuse. Part I
1. 122 Wash. 2d 299, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993).
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examines the discovery tactics used in Fisons. Part II explains Rule
26(g) as interpreted by Washington and federal courts. Part Im contends
that Fisons represents a larger phenomenon of discovery abuse that will
abate only with aggressive judicial action to enforce the rules. Part IV
argues that Fisons illustrates the need for reform and suggests that the
Washington Supreme Court should clarify the legal standard for Rule




In January 1986, two-year-old Jennifer Pollock suffered severe and
permanent brain damage after being treated with the asthma drug
Somophyllin Oral Liquid (Somophyllin), a brand :aame for the generic
drug theophylline.2 Jennifer's parents sued the doctor who gave her the
drug and the drug manufacturer, the Fisons Corporation. The doctor
cross-claimed against the drug company, alleging that Fisons had failed
to warn him about the dangers of the drug. In January 1989, the doctor
and his insurance company settled with the Pollocks for $1 million. The
claims against the drug company continued into a fourth year of
discovery.
Over a year after the doctor settled with the Pollocks, an anonymous
source sent a "smoking gun" document to the Pollocks' attorney. The
document, a 1981 letter from Fisons to physicians, warned of possible
"life-threatening theophylline toxicity" when children took the drug
while suffering a viral infection.3 The letter proved that Fisons knew of
the risks of theophylline at least four years before Jennifer Pollock was
severely disabled by the drug,4 thus contradictiag Fisons's primary
defense in the litigation.
Shortly after the letter surfaced, the Pollocks and the doctor moved for
sanctions for discovery abuse, claiming that Fisons and its attorneys at
the Seattle law firm of Bogle & Gates should have produced the
theophylline letter in response to discovery requests. A special discovery
master denied sanctions, but ordered Fisons to deliver all documents
requested relating to theophylline. The next day, a second "smoking
2. Id. at 307, 858 P.2d at 1058.
3. Id. at 307-08, 858 P.2d at 1058.
4. Id. at 337, 858 P.2d at 1074.
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gun" document was found among the 10,000 documents delivered. This
document, a 1985 internal Fisons memorandum, reported a dramatic
increase in seizures, permanent brain damage, and death caused by
theophylline' The memo indicated that physicians might not be aware
of these risks and concluded that the "epidemic" of theophylline toxicity
justified an end to promotional activities. Yet the company continued to
market the drug to unwitting physicians until 1990.
Shortly after the 1985 memorandum was found, Fisons settled with
the Pollocks for $6.9 million. The doctor's claims against Fisons,
however, went to trial. The court awarded the doctor $3.2 million plus
attorneys' fees based on product liability and Consumer Protection Act
claims,6 but denied a renewed motion for sanctions for discovery abuse.7
Fisons appealed the judgment to the Washington Supreme Court. The
doctor and his insurance company cross-appealed the trial court's refusal
to impose sanctions. The supreme court affirmed the judgment but
reduced the doctor's damages.8 The court also held that Fisons had
violated Rule 26(g)9 and remanded the case for a determination of
appropriate sanctions. The trial court approved a settlement agreement
imposing a sanction of $325,000 on Fisons and its attorneys, to be paid
to the doctor's insurance company.'0
In support of sanctions, the doctor and the Pollocks had argued that
they had repeatedly requested the smoking gun documents through
interrogatories and requests for production during the four years
preceding the dramatic revelation of their existence. Fisons and its
attorneys responded that these documents did not fall within the scope of
discovery, which they claim was limited to the Somophyllin files. Both
5. Id. at 309, 858 P.2d at 1059.
6. Id. at 309-10, 858 P.2d at 1059.
7. Id. at 308, 858 P.2d at 1059.
8. The court held that the doctor was not entitled to recover for his pain and suffering under the
Consumer Protection Act, thus reducing his damages to $1.1 million. Id. at 318, 858 P.2d at 1064.
9. Id. at 352, 858 P.2d at 1083. Rule 26(g) requires discovery requests to be signed by the
attorney or pro se litigant as a certification that
he has read the request, response, or objection, and that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry it is: (1) consistent with these rules and
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law; (2) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of the litigation ....
Both attorneys and clients can be punished for violating the rule. Sanctions are mandatory, although
the exact penalty is determined by the trial judge. A party need not request sanctions for a judge to
impose them.
10. Order Imposing Sanctions, Fsons, (No. 86-2-06254-6).
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the letter and the memo" were located in the files of a different Fisons
product.'2 The doctor disputed that he had limited the scope of discovery
to the Somophyllin files." The doctor had specifically requested letters
sent by the company to physicians "concerning theophylline toxicity in
children."' 4 Fisons had responded that "[s]uch letters, if any, regarding
Somophyllin.. ." would be produced. Yet Fisons never produced the
1981 theophylline letter, purportedly because it did not "regard"
Somophyllin."5 The court concluded that Fisons should have produced
the 1981 theophylline letter in response to this discovery request.
16
The court stated that no conceivable discovery request would have
uncovered the documents, given Fisons's responses.' 7 When the doctor
and the Pollocks sought documents concerning Somophyllin, Fisons
responded that all relevant documents would be provided but failed to
produce the smoking guns.'" When the plaintiffs asked for theophylline,
Fisons claimed that the scope was limited to Somol'hyllin and, thus, did
not encompass materials related to the generic name of the drug. 9 When
they asked for the Intal files, where the letter was located, Fisons
responded that the request was not reasonably calcalated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.2"
11. Six other documents were also found, one of which indicated that Fisons knew of the risks of
theophylline for seven years before Jennifer Pollock's injury. Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief
at 32-35, Fisons, (No. 86-2-06254-6).
12. The documents were located in the files of Intal, another Fisons asthma drug. Fisons sent the
1981 letter warning of theophylline toxicity to doctors to promote Intal, which competed with
Somophyllin. 122 Wash. 2d at 347, 858 P.2d at 1080.
13. The court found that the doctor and the Pollocks never limited the scope of discovery because
they had sent discovery requests referring to both Somophyllin and theo-hylline. Yet Fisons limited
the scope of its responses to Somophyllin. The court found that the plaintiffs could not have known
that Fisous was limiting the scope to the Somophyllin files. Id. at 353, 858 P.2d at 1083.
14. Id. at 348, 858 P.2d at 1081.
15. The court found this response to be improper, stating, "[A] document that warned of the
serious dangers of the primary ingredient of Somophyllin Oral Liquid is a document regarding
Somophyllin Oral Liquid." Id. at 353, 858 P.2d at 1083 (emphasis in original).
16. Id. at 350, 858 P.2d at 1081. The court found that Fisons had promoted theophylline and
Somophyllin as one and the same, noting that Fisons referred to thcophylline and Somophyllin
interchangeably in its literature. Id. at 348, 858 P.2d at 1080.
17. Id. at352. 858 P.2dat 1083.
18. Id. at 348-49, 858 P.2d at 1081.
19. Id. at 352, 858 P.2d at 1083. Fisons responded to one theophylline request by stating, "Fisons
has no documents regarding theophylline and otherwise responsive to tis discovery request." Id. at
350, 858 P.2d at 1081.
20. 122 Wash. 2d at 350, 858 P.2d at 1082.
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The plaintiffs also requested the names of all persons who had
expressed opinions about the risks of theophylline and all Fisons
employees who had evaluated the safety of the drug.2 In its responses,
the drug company omitted the name of Cedric Grigg, Fisons's Medical
Communications Director,2 who had approved the two smoking gun
documents. As a result, the plaintiffs were unable to depose Grigg and
learn of the existence of the smoking guns.'s
Fisons never specifically objected to the production of theophylline
documents located outside of the Somophyllin files,24 leading plaintiffs'
counsel to believe that no such documents existed. Instead, Fisons
generally objected and then stated that it would produce the documents.'
Moreover, Fisons and its attorneys claimed on several occasions that no
relevant information was being withheld. In a 1989 letter to the
Pollocks' attorney, one of Fisons's attorneys stated that Fisons's files
contained no documents relevant to the plaintiffs' claims.26 In a 1989
brief, Fisons wrote that it had already produced every document related
to the plaintiffs' theory of the case.27
The doctor relied upon the claims that all relevant documents had
been or would be produced 8 and, therefore, did not move to compel
production of the theophylline documents. The court held that the
discovery responses failed to "comply with either the spirit or letter of
the discovery rules" and thus violated Rule 26(g). The court then
remanded the case to the trial court to impose sanctions against Fisons,
Bogle & Gates, or both.29 Because the parties settled, the trial judge did
not determine what type of sanction was appropriate, but merely
approved the settlement. As part of the settlement, Bogle & Gates
21. Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief at 13, Fisons, (No. 86-2-06254-6).
22. 122 Wash. 2d at 347, 858 P.2d at 1080.
23. Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief at 14, Fisons, (No. 86-2-06254-6). Fisons claimed it was
not required to list Grigg because he was not responsible for evaluating the safety of the drug.
However, this does not explain why Grigg was not listed as someone who had "expressed opinions
about the risks of theophylline." In one letter, Grigg claimed that theophylline had killed or maimed
"perhaps hundreds" of asthmatics. Id. at 35.
24. 122 Wash. 2d at 352,858 P.2d at 1083.
25. Id. Fisons repeatedly issued a general objection, followed by the statement, "Without waiver
of these objections and subject to these limitations, Fisons will produce documents responsive to this
request at plaintiff's request at a mutually agreeable time at Fisons's headquarters." Id. at 349-50,
858 P.2d at 1081.
26. Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Briefat 20, Fisons (No. 86-2-06254-6).
27. Id. at 22.
28. 122 Wash. 2d at 353, 858 P.2d at 1083.
29. Id. at 356, 858 P.2d at 1085.
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admitted that its attorneys had advised Fisons that the rules did not
require the drug company to produce the documents."
B. The Reasoning
1. The Legal Standard of Rule 26(g) Articulated in Fisons
The court held that the trial court erred when it interpreted Rule 26(g)
to require proof of intent before sanctions can be imposed.3 Rather,
Rule 26(g) imposes an objective standard, meaning that subjective belief
or good faith does not shield an attorney from the rules.32 The court also
held that the trial court erred when it concluded that: a motion to compel
discovery was a prerequisite to a sanctions motion.33
The court carefully examined the language of Rule 26(g) to interpret
its elements. The court stated that an attorney's signature certifies that
the discovery responses were made after a reasonable inquiry and are 1)
consistent with the rules; 2) not interposed for any improper purpose; and
3) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive.34 In order to be
"consistent with the rules," responses to discovery requests35 must not be
misleading.36 The court stated that fair and reasoned resistance to
discovery is not sanctionable. In contrast, misleading responses are
sanctionable because they undermine the purposes of discovery and
impair the fairness of the litigation process.
37
30. All Parties' Joint Recommendation of Award of Sanctions at 2, Fisons (No. 86-2-06254-6).
The law firm and the drug company agreed to be jointly liable for the payment of the sanction.
Order Imposing Sanctions at 2, Fisons (No. 86-2-06254-6).
31. 122 Wash. 2d at 345, 858 P.2d at 1079.
32. Id. at 343, 858 P.2d at 1078.
33. Id. at 345, 858 P.2d at 1079.
34. Id. at 344, 858 P.2d at 1078.
35. Invoking Rule 33(a), the court stated: "A response to an interrogatory must be answered
separately and fully in writing under oath, unless it is objected to, in which event the reasons for
objection shall be stated." Citing Rule 34(b), the court stated: "A response to a request for
production shall state... that inspection and related activities will be pnrmitted as requested, unless
the request is objected to .... " Id. at 343-44, 858 P.2d at 1078.
36. Id. at 346, 858 P.2d at 1079-80 (citing Jerome v. Pardis, 783 P.21 919 (Mont. 1989) (holding
responses to discovery that attempt to mislead the requesting party by concealing information
material to the other party's case are not consistent with the rules and the "spirit of discovery")).
37. Id. at 346, 858 P.2d at 1080.
Vol. 69:765, 1994
Curbing Discovery Abuse
2. Application of the Law to the Facts of Fisons
The court concluded that Fisons's discovery responses were
misleading and inconsistent with the spirit and purpose of the discovery
rules.38 Fisons never claimed that it had overlooked the smoking gun
documents among its records when crafting its responses to the discovery
requests.39 Instead, Fisons had argued that its conduct was justified for
five reasons. First, as discussed above, it claimed that the plaintiffs had
limited the scope of discovery to the Somophyllin files and, therefore,
the drug company was not obligated to produce anything not located in
those files. Second, it maintained that the theophylline documents were
never intended to relate to Somophyllin because they were developed to
promote another drug, Intal. Third, Fisons contended that it had
produced everything that it had agreed to produce or was ordered to
produce. Fourth, it argued that the plaintiffs had failed to ask for the
documents and had neglected to compel discovery. Finally, it asserted
that good lawyering requires that discovery be an adversarial process.40
The court rejected each of these arguments.4
To support its contention that it did not break the rules, Fisons
submitted affidavits of twelve legal practitioners and academics claiming
that its conduct was consistent with the practice of the local bar.42 The
court rejected the consideration of this evidence, stating that "conduct is
38. The court stated, "[Tihe spirit of the rules is violated when advocates attempt to use discovery
tools as tactical weapons rather than to expose the facts and illuminate the issues by overuse of
discovery or unnecessary use of defensive weapons or evasive responses." Id. at 341, 858 P.2d at
1077 (citing the Advisory Committee Note to the Amendments to the Rules, 97 F.R.D. 166, 216-19
(1983).
39. Id. at 352, 858 P.2d at 1083.
40. In an affidavit submitted to the court on remand, Bogle & Gates attorney Guy P. Michelson
stated that he was not attempting to avoid production of the theophylline documents. According to
the affidavit, Mr. Michelson learned of the documents in 1987-after he had responded to the
doctor's request for letters to physicians concerning theophylline toxicity. Mr. Michelson argued
that he did not believe at that time that the theophylline letters regarded Somophyllin and, thus, did
not supplement his previous responses with the newly acquired evidence. Alternatively, Mr.
Michelson argued that the responses informed the plaintiffs that Fisons was limiting the scope of
discovery to the Somophyllin files and that it was the plaintiffs' duty to object to this limitation or to
move to compel production of the documents. Michelson Aff. %3 4-10, Fisons, (No. 86-2-06254-6).
41. 122 Wash. 2d at 352-54, 858 P.2d at 1083-84.
42. One expert argued that "[t]endentious, narrow and literal positions with regard to discovery
are, in my opinion both typical and expected in the civil discovery process. A lawyer has no
obligation to volunteer information that is not within the scope of discovery." Boemer Decl. 12,
Fisons, (No. 86-2-06254-6). Mr. Boerner is a Professor of Law at the University of Puget Sound
specializing in Professional Responsibility. Id. at 1.
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to be measured against the spirit and the purpose of the rules, not against
the standard practice of the local bar."'43
The discovery conduct of Fisons's attorneys also may have violated
the Washington Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC), 4 although the
majority opinion did not address this issue45 and no complaints were filed
with the Washington State Bar Association. First, the attorneys may
have violated RPC Rule 3.4(d), which requires a party responding to
discovery to "make [a] reasonably diligent effort to comply" with
discovery requests.46 Second, the attorneys may have violated RPC Rule
4.1(a), which prohibits attorneys from knowingly47 making "a false
statement of material fact or law to a third person. 48
43. 122 Wash. 2d at 345, 858 P.2d at 1079.
44. Washington Rules of Professional Conduct (1994) [hereinafter RPC].
45. The disciplinary procedures do not give courts the power to find a violation of the RPC, but
judges can refer cases to the bar association for investigation. A formal referral by the supreme
court, however, could prejudge an attorney's conduct and impair that attorney's right to appeal
disciplinary measures imposed by the bar association because it is the supreme court itself that hears
appeals of such measures. Yet it is useful for the supreme court to di, cuss the application of the
RPC in its opinions to help explain the rules.
In fact, the dissent in Fisons suggested that Bogle & Gates had violated RPC Rule 3.3, which
requires candor toward the tribunal, in a matter unrelated to the discovery abuse. Justice
Brachtenbach, joined by Justices Utter and Johnson, found that the attorneys had misstated the
holdings of cases they cited in their appellate brief. Id. at 368, 858 P.2d at 1091. Justice
Brachtenbach also found that the attorneys had misrepresented a ruling of the trial court at another
point in the brief and noted the "egregious lack of candor" of doing so. H. at 370, 858 P.2d at 1092.
46. RPC Rule 3.4(d). Aronson Decl. 6-11, Fsons, (No. 86-2-06254-6). Robert Aronson is a
Professor of Law at the University of Washington specializing in Professional Responsibility. Id. at
13.
47. Fisons's attorneys have now acknowledged that they knew the documents existed. Michelson
Aff. 4, Fisons, (No. 86-2-06254-6). Yet the attorneys argued that the discovery responses were not
"knowingly false" because they claimed to believe that Fisons was not obligated to produce the
documents. Id. at 10; McKinstry Aff. 5, Fsons, (No. 86-2-062544.S). Mr. McKinstry was the
head of the Litigation Department at Bogle & Gates from 1970-1991. Id. at 3.
48. RPC Rule 4.1(a). Aronson Decl. at 13. Fisons and its attorneys submitted signed discovery
documents containing statements to both the opposing counsel and the court that the supreme court
later found to be misleading. The attorneys also stated in a letter and a brief that all relevant
documents contained in Fisons's files had been produced. See supra, notes 26-27 and
accompanying text. See also Pearson Decl. 12, Fisons, (No. 86-2-06254-6) (stating that, if.Fisons's
attorneys knew that the drug company was concealing relevant evidenc- or giving false answers to
discovery requests, they violated RPC Rule 4.1(a). Vernon Pearson is a retired justice of the
Washington Supreme Court. Id. at 7. But see Boerner Decl. 11, Fisons, (No. 86-2-06254-6)
(arguing that the attorneys could not have violated RPC Rule 4.1 because an objection is a legal
argument and, thus, cannot be either true or false).
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3. The Purpose of Sanctions Under Rule 26(g)
The court listed the various purposes of sanctions and gave the trial
court general guidelines for determining a sanction on remand. The
court explained that sanctions should be sufficient to "deter, to punish, to
compensate, and to educate,"49 adding that the purpose of Rule 26(g) is
to deter discovery abuse by providing "an impetus for candor and
reason" during discovery. 0 The court stated that the sanction should
ensure that the wrongdoer does not profit from the wrong." The court
acknowledged that imposing sanctions is neither easy nor pleasant for a
trial judge, but emphasized that sanctions must be imposed when
warranted because misconduct breeds more misconduct when it is
tolerated.2 The court suggested that monetary sanctions be paid to a
court fund. 3
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF DISCOVERY RULES
A. The Origin of the Rules
Although courts have inherent authority to impose sanctions, 4 Rules
26(g) and 37 specifically direct judges to impose them for discovery
abuse. Whereas Rule 37 applies to several specific types of discovery
abuse, Rule 26(g) applies to any type of abuse committed through a
discovery request, response, or objection."
49. 122 Wash. 2d at 356, 858 P.2d at 1085.
50. Id. at 343, 858 P.2d at 1077.
51. Id. at 356, 858 P.2d at 1085.
52. Id. at 355, 858 P.2d at 1084.
53. Id. at 356, 858 P.2d at 1085.
54. This authority arises from the court's inherent power to ensure that cases are resolved in an
expeditious and orderly manner. Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962).
55. Rule 37 allows, but does not require, judges to impose sanctions on a party who has violated a
discovery order, failed to admit a true fact, or failed to object or respond to an interrogatory or
request for production. R.F. Barron Corp. v. Nuclear Fields PTY, Ltd., No. 91-C7610, 1993 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 8404 at *18 (N.D. Ill. June 21, 1993) (interpreting federal rule 37, which mirrors the
Washington rule).
In contrast, Rule 26(g) is broader in its application and stricter in its enforcement. It requires
parties and attorneys to sign each discovery request, response, or objection certifying that, to the best
of their knowledge formed after a reasonable inquiry, it comports with the letter and the spirit of the
rules. Estate ofEckel v. Narciso, 154 B.R. 527,529 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992). It also requires ajudge
to impose sanctions against a party violating the rule.
Rule 37 was not applicable in Fisons for two reasons. First, the defendant did not have the
opportunity to violate a discovery order because the plaintiff, believing that no theophylline
Washington Law Review Vol. 69:765, 1994
The federal courts adopted Rule 26(g) in 198351 to help enforce the
liberal discovery rules. In 1947, the U.S. Supreme Court discussed the
high hopes of those who developed the liberal discovery system in
Hickman v. Taylor, stating that "[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant
facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation."58 More
than 30 years after Hickman, however, the ideals of liberal discovery
were still inhibited by practitioner misuse of discovery tactics. In 1979,
the Supreme Court declared that discovery was "not infrequently" being
exploited to the disadvantage of justice 9 In that same year, the Court
signaled its desire to deter discovery abuse in National Hockey League v.
Metropolitan Hockey Club.60 In National Hockey League, the Court
upheld the dismissal of a claim as a sanction for discovery abuse,
reasoning that severe sanctions were appropriate, not merely to penalize
wrongdoers, but also to deter those tempted to engage in discovery
abuse.
documents existed, did not seek one. Second, the defendant did not fail to respond, but submitted
misleading answers.
Although Fisons's conduct would thus not have been sanctionable under Rule 37 at the time it
occurred, it would be sanctionable on that basis under the recently amended Washington rules. Rule
37 now treats an evasive and misleading response as a failure to respond. Civil Rule 37(d) as
amended, effective September 1, 1993.
56. Washington adopted the rule in 1985.
57. Congress amended the discovery rules in November 1993 to reqAire voluntary disclosure of
certain information within 30 days after service of defendant's answer. Under the revised rule,
plaintiff and defendant are required to identify all persons having information that bears significantly
on the claims or defenses, copy or describe all documents that bear significantly on the claims or
defenses, estimate damages, and disclose any insurance agreement that may satisfy the judgment.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Washingtor, however, has yet to adopt
this rule.
Although the rule change would expedite the exchange of certain type,: of information, it would be
unlikely to affect the type of discovery abuse that occurred in Fisons, because attorneys would still
balk at disclosing smoking gun documents. For example, if the new rule had been in effect during
the discovery phase of Fisons, the drug company still could have failed -:o disclose the theophylline-
related documents by claiming they did not "bear significantly" on the Somophyllin claim because
they did not relate to Somophyllin. Although such an argument would ::ail in the wake of Fisons, it
would fail irrespective of the rule change. And unless the wrongdoer is caught and punished under
the new rule, such abuse will continue. Therefore, unless accompanied by better judicial
enforcement, no change in the rules would be likely to affect cases like Fsons.
See Thomas M. Mengler, Eliminating Abusive Discovery Through Disclosure: Is It Time Again
For Reform?, 138 F.R.D. 155 (1992).
58. 329 U.S. 495,507 (1947).
59. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 179 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
60. 427 U.S. 639 (1979) (per curiam).
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Heeding the Court's admonitions in National Hockey League, the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules61 drafted Rule 26(g) four years later.
Rule 26(g) seeks to thwart discovery abuse by requiring an attorney to
conduct pretrial discovery in a responsible manner.6" The rule mandates
that judges impose sanctions when a party fails to comply with the spirit
or purpose of Rules 26 through 37.63 To make it easier for judges to find
discovery violations, the rule contains an objective reasonable inquiry
requirement, similar to Civil Rule 11.' The rule does not require the
attorney to certify that the client's factual responses to discovery requests
are actually true, but rather that the attorney has made a reasonable effort
to assure that the client has provided all information responsive to the
request.
65
The Advisory Committee emphasized that sanctions are more
effective when they are consistently imposed as both a penalty for
discovery abuse and a deterrent for potential abusers.66 Sanctions can be
a reprimand, costs and attorneys' fees associated with the abuse,
injunctive relief, disbarment from practicing before the forum court,
dismissal or preclusion of a claim or defense, default judgment, a bar on
the introduction of evidence, or anything else the court finds
appropriate.67 However, the most common type of sanctions are the
payment of costs and attorneys' fees associated with the abuse.68
61. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States
(Advisory Committee).
62. Bergeson v. Dilworth, 132 F.R.D. 277, 292 (D. Kan. 1990) (citing the Advisory Committee
Note to the Amendments to the Rules 97 F.R.D. 165, 216-20 (1983)).
63. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (citing the Advisory Committee Note, supra
note 62).
64. The rule's previous subjective standard allowed offending attorneys to claim the "safe harbor"
of subjective good faith to insulate them from sanctions. Bergeson, 132 F.R.D. at 292. Given that
bad faith was difficult to establish, the subjective approach made judges reluctant to impose
sanctions. Chambers, 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
65. Fretz v. Keltner, 109 F.R.D. 303, 310 (D. Kan. 1985) (citing the Advisory Committee Note,
supra note 62).
66. Advisory Committee Note, supra note 62, at 220.
67. Gregory P. Joseph, Sanctions: The Federal Law ofLitigation Abuse 494 (1989).
68. Id. at 495.
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B. Discovery Abuse in Federal Court: The Interpretation of
"Reasonable Inquiry" and the Imposition of Sanctions
1. The Interpretation of "Reasonable Inquiry"
Because Rule 26(g) requires an attorney to base discovery responses
on a reasonable inquiry into the factual and legal basis of the discovery
response,"9 the definition of "reasonable inquiry" is critical to the
interpretation of the rule.7" What is reasonable is a matter for the court to
decide, based on the totality of the circumstances.7 A party is required
to use reasonable efforts to gather responsive information.72 At a
minimum, the attorney or the client must establish a reasonable
procedure for the collection of responsive information.73 Counsel can
rely on statements from the client as long as that reliance is appropriate.
74
Obviously, if counsel responds to the discovery request without even
asking the client to look for responsive material, counsel has failed to
conduct a reasonable inquiry.75 Yet a reasonable inquiry into the facts
ordinarily requires more than exclusive reliance on the client.76 If an
attorney uncovers facts during the investigation that conflict with those
provided by the client, the attorney must either convince the client of the
true facts or withdraw.77
A responding party must not only conduct a reasonable inquiry, but it
must also use the information obtained to give a complete response.78
When counsel knows, or with a reasonable inquiry should have known, a
fact necessary to a complete response and fails to disclose that fact, Rule
69. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.LD. 543, 555 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
(citing the Advisory Committee Note, supra note 62).
70. The reasonable inquiry requirement parallels that of Rule 11. Apex Oil Co. v. Belcher Co. of
New York, 855 F.2d 1009, 1015 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing the Advisory Committee Note, supra note
62).
71. United States v. Kramer, No. 89-4340(G), 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7651 at *11 (D.NJ. March
31, 1992) (citing the Advisory Committee Note, supra note 62).
72 Id.
73. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. at 556.
74. Kramer, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7651 at *11.
75. Perkinson v. Houlihan's/D.C., Inc., 110 F.R.D. 55, 58 (D.D.C. 1986) afl'd, Perkinson v.
Gilbert/Robinson, Inc., 821 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1987). See also Bergeson v. Dilworth, 132 F.R.D.
277, 292 (D. Kan. 1990) (imposing sanctions on counsel who admitted having "flat missed"
information relevant to the accuracy of his discovery response).
76. Bergeson, 132 F.R.D. at 288.
77. Id.
78. Kramer, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7651 at *16. See also Bergeson, 132 F.R.D. at 289.
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26(g) is violated.79  Because discovery documents deal with more
specific subject matter than motions or papers, Rule 26(g) imposes a
more stringent certification requirement than Rule 11. 
2. The Imposition of Sanctions for Discovery Abuse
The nature of the sanction imposed is a matter of judicial discretion to
be exercised in light of the particular circumstances."1 Although judges
normally limit sanctions to costs and attorneys' fees associated with the
abuse,82 courts do occasionally impose more severe monetary sanctions 3
or non-monetary sanctions, such as default judgments, when the
discovery abuse is particularly egregious.8 4
In a case of egregious discovery abuse similar to that committed in
Fisons, a district court imposed varied penalties. In National Association
of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, the defendant had destroyed critical
evidence and had failed to comply with multiple discovery requests.
The court stated that the defendant had violated the reasonable inquiry
requirement of Rule 26(g) and had engaged in willful or reckless
obstruction of discovery. The court required the defendant to pay the
plaintiff class $105,000 in attorneys' fees, $15,000 to the clerk of the
court for unnecessary use of the court's time, and the expenses of a
special master to monitor discovery for the rest of the case.86
In another case similar to Fisons, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a
sanction that included a default judgment, fines against the clients and
attorneys, and costs and attorneys' fees associated with the abuse. In that
case, Malautea v. Suzuki, 7 the defendant "stubbornly withheld
79. Perldnson, 110 F.R.D. at 58.
80. Apex Oil Co. v. Belcher Co. of New York, 855 F.2d 1009, 1015 (2d Cir. 1988).
81. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543, 562 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
(citing the Advisory Committee Note, supra note 62).
82. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
83. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (holding that $1 million sanction against a
plaintiff who abused discovery in bad faith was not an abuse of discretion).
84. Monroe v. Ridley, 135 F.R.D. 1, 2-3 (D.D.C. 1990) (imposing default judgment on defendant
who failed to cooperate in discovery and, later, falsely assured the court that all relevant documents
had been turned over); cf. Perkinson v. Houlihan's/D.C., Inc., 110 F.R.D. 55 (1986), aff'd, Perkinson
v. Gilbert/Robinson, Inc., 821 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding that a new trial would be more
appropriate than a default judgment).
85. 115 F.R.D. 543 (N.D. Cal. 1987). Like the plaintiffs in Fisons, the plaintiffs learned of the
withholding of evidence through an anonymous letter. Id. at 546.
86. Id. at 559.
87. 987 F.2d 1536 (1 lth Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 5655 (1993).
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discoverable information" by improperly objecting, providing partial
responses to interrogatories," and deliberately concealing damaging
evidence.89 The court found that these discovery tactics were a violation
of Rule 26(g) because they were used for an improper purpose.90 The
court stated that an attorney's duty to a client can never outweigh his or
her duties as an officer of the court.9
C. The Interpretation of "Reasonable Inquiry" and the Imposition of
Sanctions by Washington Courts
1. The Interpretation of "Reasonable Inquiry"
The Washington Supreme Court had never examined Rule 26(g) prior
to Fisons. However, the sole Washington Court of Appeals case
interpreting the rule92 held that the plaintiff had violated the reasonable
inquiry requirement by submitting discovery responses that were
unreasonable under the circumstances.93
Washington cases interpreting the reasonable inquiry requirement of
Rule 11 employ a similar standard. In John Doe v. Spokane & Inland
Empire Blood Bank, the court of appeals said the reasonable inquiry
requirement was to be judged on whether a reasonable attorney in similar
circumstances could believe his or her actions were factually and legally
88. Id. at 1540. In addition to violating discovery orders, defen.ants improperly refused to
answer interrogatories on the grounds that certain words and phrases were ambiguous, leading the
judge to conclude that the defendants' objections were part of an Dverall plan to obstruct the
plaintiff's discovery attempts. The defendants also responded to general questions by limiting their
answers to a narrow field.
89. Id.
90. The court also found that, in failing to comply with a discovery order, the defendant had
violated Rule 37(b), which specifies that dismissal or default judgment is an appropriate sanction.
Even if the defendant had not violated a discovery order, a default judgment would have been
appropriate under Rule 26(g), especially since the court held that the defendant and its attorneys
engaged in an "unrelenting campaign to obfuscate the truth." Id. at 1544.
91. Id. at 1546. The court acknowledged that the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
underscore the duty to advocate zealously and neglect the corresponding duty to advocate within the
bounds of the law, thus encouraging attorneys to override their "ancient" duties as officers of the
court. Id. at 1546-47.
92. Clipse v. State, 61 Wash. App. 94, 808 P.2d 777 (1991) (holding that sanctions were proper
under Rule 26(g) when the plaintiff made misleading disclosures of expert witnesses during
discovery).
93. Id. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that, since Rule 26(g) does not actually require
discovery responses to be well-grounded in fact, his inaccurate discovery responses were not
sanctionable under the rule. Id. at 102 n.4, 808 P.2d at 780 n.4.
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justified.94 In Miller v. Badgley, the court of appeals held that an
attorney's "blind reliance" on a client's representations would rarely
constitute a reasonable inquiry.
95
2. The Imposition of Sanctions for Discovery Abuse
Although Washington courts have rarely imposed severe sanctions for
discovery abuse, such sanctions are not unprecedented. In Snedigar v.
Hoddersen, the Washington Supreme Court stated in dicta that the
imposition of a default judgment is appropriate where a party willfully
refuses to comply with a discovery order and substantially prejudices an
opponent's ability to prepare for trial.96 The court defined a willful
violation as one committed without a reasonable excuse.97
Moreover, appellate courts have overruled some trial courts for
imposing insufficient sanctions. In Gammon v. Clark Equipment Co.,
98
the court of appeals remanded a case for a new trial when the sanction
for discovery abuse was de minimis. In Gammon, a product liability
action, the defendant violated a court order to produce all relevant
accident reports and produced them at trial only after a twist of fate
similar to that in Fisons.99 The trial court imposed a sanction of $2,500.
The court of appeals stated that this award was de minimis in the context
of a $4.5 million case." Such a small sanction would encourage
litigants to delay and commit evasive tactics.'
94. 55 Wash. App. 106, 111, 780 P.2d 853, 857 (1989).
95. 51 Wash. App. 285, 302, 753 P.2d 530, 539, review denied, 11 Wash. 2d 1007 (1988).
96. 114 Wash. 2d 153, 169,786 P.2d 781,788 (1990).
97. Id.
98. 38 Wash. App. 274, 686 P.2d 1102 (1984), affd, remanded, en banc, 104 Wash. 2d 613, 707
P.2d 685 (1985) (stating that a defendant should not determine unilaterally what is relevant to a
plaintiffs claim).
99. Id. at 278, 686 P.2d at 1105. A person seeking to sue the same defendant for a similar injury
came to plaintiff's counsel's office on the eve of trial. This gave counsel cause to believe that all of
the accident reports ordered by the court had not been produced. Idl
100. Id. at 282,686 P.2d at 1107.
101. Id., 686P.2dat 1107.
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I. FISONS IS A PRODUCT OF A SYSTEM TIAT ALLOWS
LAWYERS TO ABUSE DISCOVERY WITH VIRTUAL
IMPUNITY
A. Fisons Illustrates the Need for Aggressive Judicial Action To Curb
Discovery Abuse
The legal community need look no further than Fisons to see the need
for aggressive judicial action to curb discovery abuse. In Fisons, the
discovery system failed. The disclosure of critical evidence hinged on
the benevolence of an anonymous party, instead of on the checks and
balances of the discovery system.' 2
Fisons represents a systemic problem. Discovery abuse is common in
large cases °3 with millions of dollars resting on the outcome.' 4 The
most pervasive type of discovery abuse is the use of incomplete or
evasive responses to discovery requests,0 5 which occurred in Fisons.
For every case in which a smoking gun appears by chance, there is surely
a case in which evasive tactics pay off."°6 Misleading and evasive tactics
not only prevent justice for individual litigants, but also compromise the
system's ability to adjudicate disputes fairly.0 7 Moreover, concealing
evidence in product liability cases like Fisons pelpetrates an injustice
against the public by delaying disclosure of a pro duct's dangers.'
08
102. See Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and
Proposals for Change, 31 Vand. L. Rev. 1295, 1359 (1978) (arguing that adversarial discovery
leaves the achievement ofjustice to chance).
103. Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Discovery Abuse Revisited: Some Specific Proposals to Amend the
FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 6 U.S.F. L. Rev. 189, 191-92 (1992).
104. Charles B. Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 2 Rev. Litig. 71, 87
(1981).
105. Wayne D. Brazil, Improving Judicial Controls over the Pretrial Development of Civil
Actions: Model Rules for Case Management and Sanctions, 1981 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 873, 880
(1981); see also C. Ronald Ellington, A Study of Sanctions for Discvery Abuse, Federal Justice
Research Program, Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice 9 (1979) (concluding
that disputes over unanswered or incompletely answered interrogatories and requests for production
give rise to the greatest number of sanctions motions).
106. The use of misleading and evasive tactics is difficult to detect, 2xcept in rare cases when the
smoking gun is inadvertently disclosed. Renfrew, supra note 104, at 88.
107. When fairness is only fortuitous, people become alienated from our system ofjustice. Brazil,
supra note 102, at 1359; see also Renfrew, supra note 104, at 72 (contending that pretrial abuses
prevent future litigants from using the judicial process to vindicate their rights).
108. As soon as the smoking gun documents were discovered, the judge ordered that they be sent
to the federal Food and Drug Administration, which then required that warning labels be placed on
all theophylline products. If the documents had been disclosed when the plaintiffs requested them,
they would have been sent to the FDA three years earlier.
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B. The Roots of Discovery Abuse
Discovery abuse is rooted in the adversarial nature of litigation, the
economic structure of our legal system, and the failure to require lawyers
to behave as officers of the court. Until discovery reforms address these
root causes, discovery abuse will continue. 9
Although the discovery rules were specifically designed to make the
process less adversarial,"0 litigators' adversarial instincts lead' them to
"duck and dodge" during discovery.' Lawyers are raised on the basic
tenet that the interests of the client are paramount."' Pressures to behave
adversarially militate against the production of all of the information
necessary to resolve disputes fairly."
13
The economic structure of our legal system reinforces the adversarial
character of discovery."1 4 Hourly billing gives lawyers an economic
interest in excessive discovery."' The huge profits that litigators stand to
gain through the use of contingent fees create incentives to abuse
discovery." 6 Fears about malpractice increase a litigator's resistance to
disclosure of incriminating information." 7  Moreover, highly
sophisticated corporate clients can encourage discovery abuse when the
financial stakes are high."'
These cultural and economic pressures to be a zealous advocate
conflict with a lawyer's role as an officer of the court." 9 The law does
not stress a lawyer's independent duty to seek truth when it is not in the
109. See Michael E. Wolfson, Addressing the Adversarial Dilemma of Civil Discovery, 36 CIev.
St. L. Rev. 17,45 (1987-88).
110. Id. at 64.
111. Attorney William Helsell, arguing against sanctions in Fisons; see Stuart Taylor Jr., Sleazy in
Seattle, The Am. Lawyer, April 1994, at 76.
112. Wolfson, supra note 109, at 49. Some jurisdictions require lawyers to "represent a client
zealously within the bounds of the law." Model Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 7
(1981). The Washington Rules of Professional Conduct, however, contain no such provision.
113. Brazil, supra note 102, at 1360.
114. Id. at 1296.
115. Abraham D. Sofaer, Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery Abuse Under the New Federal
Rules: On the Limited Utility ofPunishment, 57 St. John's L. Rev. 680, 727 (1983).
116. Renfrew, supra note 104, at 88.
117. Wolfson, supra note 109, at 47.
118. Dudley, supra note 103, at 221. In high stakes corporate litigation, it is unlikely that the
client is uninvolved in the discovery strategy. Id.
119. Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 39, 87 (1989).
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client's interest. 2° The following statement from the United States
Supreme Court sends a mixed signal at best:
Under our adversary system, the role of counsel is not to make sure
the truth is ascertained but to advance... [thel client's cause by
any ethical means. Within the limits of professional propriety,
causing delay and sowing confusion not only are ... [counsel's]
right but may be... [counsel's] duty.'
121
C. Deterrence of Discovery Abuse Requires that .fudges Punish Abuse
and Closely Supervise Discovery in Large, Complex Cases
Given the pressures to abuse discovery, the discovery system needs
external controls to function properly." Yet the existing control
mechanism, Rule 26(g), has been thus far ineffective because judges are
still reluctant to impose sanctions." Although the Supreme Court has
directed courts to impose punitive sanctions to deter discovery abuse,
12 4
courts have not done so. 2 ' The relatively light Sanctions that judges
have frequently imposed under the rule 126 pale by comparison to the
potential benefits of abuse. Judges must impose severe sanctions to
reduce this incentive to break the rules. 27 Because the threat of even
sizable monetary sanctions may not deter abuse in large cases, courts
should also refer such cases to the bar for disciplinary action.
28
Yet no system of sanctions and disciplinary action will curb discovery
abuse as effectively as more judicial involvement in discovery. 29 Such
120. Renfrew, supra note 103, at 88.
121. Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.s. 305,325 (1985).
122. Brazil, supra note 104, at 884.
123. Id. at 924. Rule 26(g) has failed to live up to its potential because courts do not often use it.
8 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2052 (Supp. 1993).
124. See supra, note 60 and accompanying text.
125. Dudley, supra note 103, at 218-19. Instead of imposing deterrent sanctions, courts have
preferred to impose the least severe sanction necessary to compensate the aggrieved party. Renfrew,
supra note 104, at 85.
126. Judges normally award only costs and attorneys' fees associated with the abuse. Wolfson,
supra note 109, at 45. It can be argued that such compensatory fines are not actually sanctions; the
term "sanction" connotes punishment, not compensation. Brazil, supra note 105, at 941.
127. Renfrew, supra note 104, at 83.
128. Brazil, supra note 105, at 952.
129. Ellington, supra note 105, at 8.
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involvement increases the probability that abuse will be detected 3 ' and
decreases the likelihood that it will occur in the first place. 3' Early
discovery conferences help to define the issues in dispute' and put
parties on notice that abusive behavior will result in sanctions.'33
IV. FISONS ILLUSTRATES THE NEED FOR REFORM
Fisons illustrates that the discovery system is in need of reform. The
court system failed to detect the abuse, initially failed to conclude that
Fisons and Bogle & Gates had violated the rules, and ultimately failed to
impose a sanction stiff enough to prevent this type of discovery abuse
from happening again.
Fisons's significance lies in the fact that the Washington Supreme
Court is now enforcing Rule 26(g).'34 The objective standard of the rule
will prevent attorneys from claiming lack of intent, ignorance of the
rules, or "everybody does it" as a defense to claims of discovery
violations. Fisons does not, however, break new legal ground. 35 Rather,
the court affirmed the status quo interpretation of the rule by issuing a
vague legal standard and neglecting to specify what type of sanctions
trial courts should impose.
A. The Fisons Legal Standard Is Vague
First, the court neither explained the reasonable inquiry requirement
nor articulated how Fisons and its attorneys failed to conduct a
130. Much discovery abuse will inevitably go undetected, making the imposition of severe
sanctions when parties do get caught even more critical for deterrence. Renfrew, supra note 104, at
90.
131. Ellington, supra note 105, at 116.
132. Dudley, supra note 103, at 199.
133. Id. at 222.
134. Fisons's legal experts contended that the court should have provided notice of the rule's
requirements before imposing sanctions. Boemer Decl. 112, Fisons, (No. 86-2-06254-6). However,
as noted below, notice of the rule's requirements could be found in federal and Washington caselaw.
See infra note 134. It would have set an absurd precedent to exonerate these defendants from the
rule's requirements merely because they were the first offenders to be sanctioned by the supreme
court. Such a precedent could strip all new or dormant rules of their deterrent effect.
135. After the court issued the opinion, Fisons's attorneys declared in the media that the decision
"changed the rules." Jolayne Houtz, Fines Say It's Not OK to Withhold Evidence, Seattle Times,
Jan. 30, 1994, at B2. However, although Washington courts had not interpreted Rule 26(g) in a
published opinion prior to 1991, the Fisons court did not change the rules. The court merely
rearticulated the requirements of the rule that had been described in a Washington appellate case,
federal cases, and by the committee that developed the federal version of rule 26(g).
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reasonable inquiry. Second, the court failed to state explicitly that a
lawyer's duty as an officer of the court to conform to the discovery rules
will always trump the client's interests when these goals conflict. Third,
the holding implies that narrow, literal interpretations of discovery
requests violate the discovery rules, but the court's reasoning does not
address the boundaries of such a standard.
The Fisons court did not clarify the reasonable inquiry requirement.
The court stated that Rule 26(g) imposes an objective standard,
determined that the responses were improper, anc. ended the analysis
there. The court said the trial court should have engaged in a two-step
analysis to determine whether Fisons had violated Rule 26(g). First, the
trial court should have asked whether the attorney certified the responses
to the best of his knowledge after a reasonable inquiry. Second, it should
have determined whether the responses were consistent with the
underlying discovery rules. 36 However, the court skipped the reasonable
inquiry requirement and confined its analysis to the substantive issue of
whether the discovery tactics were consistent with the rules.'37 The court
concluded that Fisons broke those rules 3 ' by issuing misleading or "non"
responses to the discovery requests.'39
Although compliance with Rule 26(g) seems to turn on whether a
party has made a reasonable inquiry, the court failed to articulate what
kind of an inquiry constitutes a reasonable one. 4 ' Exclusive reliance on
136. The court explained that Rule 26(g) also requires that the discovery document be (2) not
interposed for an improper purpose, or (3) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive.
122 Wash. 2d at 344, 858 P.2d at 1078. Although Fisons rested on whether the responses were
consistent with the rules, the vague responses and the systematic nature of the discovery evasion
suggest that Fisons did act with an improper purpose-to conceal discoverable evidence. If the court
had stated that the discovery responses were interposed for an improper purpose, the court could
have found that Fisons acted recklessly or in bad faith. Such a statement would have made the
opinion stronger and, perhaps, the sanction harsher.
137. Given the systematic nature of the discovery abuse, it would appear that the court assumed
that Fisons and Bogle & Gates knew that the documents existed and, thus, had no need to reach the
reasonable inquiry question. However, the attorneys at Bogle & Gates did not admit that they knew
about the documents until after the supreme court decided this case.
138. The Fisons court said that Rule 33(a) and Rule 34(b) require a party to answer all
interrogatories and requests for production filly unless a specific and clear objection is made. If
Fisons did not want to respond or if it disagreed with the scope of discovery, the rules required it to
move for a protective order. 122 Wash. 2d at 353-54, 858 P.2d at 1083-84.
139. Id. at 347, 858 P.2d at 1080.
140. The Fisons court said a trial court should consider all of the surrounding circumstances, the
importance of the evidence to the proponent, and the ability of the opposing party to formulate a
response when determining whether an attorney has complied with th-. rule. Id. at 343, 858 P.2d
1078. Although these factors may have comprised the court's attempt to shed light on the standard,
they are more relevant to the severity of the abuse than to the reasonableness of the inquiry.
Vol. 69:765, 1994
Curbing Discovery Abuse
a client's assertion that relevant documents do not exist would rarely
constitute a reasonable inquiry.' 4' But what if an attorney reads every
document provided by the client and still does not uncover the smoking
gun? To what degree must an attorney challenge a client's (or corporate
counsel's) claim that all relevant material is being provided? The court
said only that the reasonable inquiry requirement is governed by an
objective standard. This statement sheds no new light on Rule 26(g),
because the rule's plain language indicates an objective standard.
The court rejected the use of evidence of the local standard of legal
practice to show that the attorneys at Bogle & Gates were complying
with Rule 26(g).142 The court's decision to reject evidence of community
norms indicates that practitioners have an absolute duty to conduct
discovery in a responsible manner. Yet how far does that duty go? The
court never stated that a lawyer's duty to the court transcends his or her
duties to the client. In failing to address the cultural and economic
pressures to engage in adversarial discovery, the court missed a golden
opportunity to give meaning to the phrase "officer of the court."
Although it is now clear that a party must turn over information that
the opponent asks for directly, it is not clear whether a practitioner must
volunteer information that the opponent requests obliquely. The court
emphasized an attorney's responsibilities to comply with the spirit and
purpose of the discovery rules. Yet, although the Washington rules
encourage the free flow of information, they do not yet mandate it.
43
Therefore, the requesting party still technically bears the burden of
soliciting information in discovery. The Fisons opinion hints that the
requesting party's burden of precision in crafting discovery requests is
declining and that the responding party's burden to produce is
commensurately rising.'" Yet the court neither states this nor articulates
the limits of such a standard.
45
141. See supra notes 25, 95 and accompanying text.
142. Regardless of whether adversarial discovery tactics represent the community norm, Fisons's
specific conduct may well have fallen outside the boundaries of that norm.
143. The federal rules now mandate the automatic exchange of certain information at the outset of
the litigation. See supra note 57.
144. See Stephen Gillers, Truth or Consequences, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1994, at 103 (suggesting that
Fisons could foreshadow a decline in the use of adversarial semantics in discovery).
145. It can be argued that Fisons's ambiguity will promote compliance with the spirit of the
discovery rules more effectively than the articulation of a bright line rule would have because
lawyers are adept at finding ways around such rules. This ambiguity will certainly produce positive
results if the decision compels attorneys to err on the side of disclosure.
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Given that the court failed to articulate a clear standard, the court
apparently ordered sanctions against Fisons and its attorneys based on
the facts of the case. Since Fisons, hopefully, represents the outer
boundary of discovery abuse, its facts do not shed much light on
appropriate discovery conduct for the average practitioner.
B. Fisons Fails To Set a Precedent for Meaningful Sanctions To Deter
Discovery Abuse
The Fisons court missed an opportunity to set a precedent for serious
enforcement of the discovery rules. Instead of establishing a baseline
level of sanctions sufficient for the sort of abuse committed in the case,
the court described the purpose of sanctions in general terms. Lacking
specific guidance, the trial court approved an inadequate settlement as a
sanction.'46 The sanction inadequately compensated the injured parties
and failed to implement the purposes the Supreme Court articulated.
147
Contrary to the court's mandate, the sanction did not fully compensate
the parties and it completely failed to fulfill the detsrrence, punishment,
and education functions that the court directed the trial court to address.
Deterrence of future abusers requires that sanctions be severe and
detection and punishment of abusers be consistent.
1. The Trial Court Approved a Sanction That Provides Inadequate
Compensation
The sanction did not begin to compensate fully the injuries caused by
the discovery abuse. More than three years elapsed from the time the
documents should have been produced by the discovery requests to the
time they surfaced. Concealing the smoking gun documents during this
time injured the insurance company, the doctor, the taxpayers, the
legitimacy of our legal system, and the health and safety of the public.
The sanction should have addressed and compensated each of these
injuries.
146. Although settlement should normally be encouraged, it seemed improper in this case because
the injury was not limited to the individual parties. Given the ovelriding public interest in an
effective sanction, the court should have determined the sanction based on the purposes it was to
serve. The party-driven approach to sanctions relies upon the very self-policing mechanism that
proved inadequate in the underlying case.
147. If the court had given the trial court more specific guidance about sanctions, it is unlikely the
parties would have settled for such an amount.
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First, the sanction did not fully compensate the insurance company for
its $500,000 settlement with the Pollocks. Neither did the sanction cover
the legal fees paid by the insurance company as a result of the discovery
abuse. Second, it did not compensate the doctor for any of his discovery
abuse-related injuries148 or for his legal expenses.'49 Third, the sanction
failed to compensate the public for the court costs incurred as a result of
the concealment of this evidence. The costs included several hearings
with a special discovery master to resolve the dispute, the use of two trial
judges to hear the sanctions motion, the appeal of the sanctions ruling to
the supreme court, and the four-year delay in resolving the Pollocks'
case. Fourth, because liability in this case hinged on the anonymous
revelation of this evidence, Fisons's and Bogle & Gates's conduct
undermined the credibility of our justice system.
Most important, the concealment of this evidence threatened public
health and safety. Fisons continued marketing Somophyllin without a
warning label until 1990, when the government mandated such labels.
Although the injury to public health and safety stemming from this
cannot be quantified, the product continued to be marketed aggressively
to unsuspecting doctors treating asthmatic children.
2. The Sanction Did Not Sufficiently Deter, Punish, or Educate
First, the sanction should have been high enough to deter Fisons, its
attorneys, and other potential abusers from abusing discovery in the
future. In order to deter the client and others, the sanction would have
had to be high enough to significantly reduce the economic incentive to
conceal critical discoverable evidence. In a case in which damages alone
were over $8 million, a $325,000 sanction is unlikely to convince future
litigants to follow the rules.
Fisons faced three potential scenarios at the outset of the litigation.
First, Fisons could have concealed the documents and not gotten caught
and thus might not have been found liable. The cost of this scenario
would have been nothing, assuming attorneys' fees remain constant.
148. Neither did the doctor recover on his substantive claims for injuries sustained from Fisons's
discovery abuse, which included his premature settlement with the Pollocks and the protraction of
his case against Fisons. At trial, the court disallowed references to the discovery disputes. 122
Wash.2d at 333, 858 P.2d at 1072. As a result, the jury did not conclude that the doctor was entitled
to recovery on a litigation fraud theory and, thus, did not award him compensation for his discovery-
related injuries.
149. The court awarded the doctor half of his legal expenses under the Consumer Protection Act,
however.
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Second, Fisons could have disclosed the documents when the plaintiffs
asked for them. The cost of this decision would have been $8 million,
the ultimate costs that Fisons incurred as a result of the substantive
claims of the doctor and the Pollocks. Third, Fisons could have
concealed the documents and been caught, which is what happened. The
cost of this scenario was $8 million for the substantive claims plus the
$325,000 sanction.
Based on this purely economic analysis, it is easy to see why a
defendant and its attorneys might choose to conceal evidence and face
the risk of being caught. 50 The benefit of successfully concealing the
documents in Fisons, when compared to the cost of disclosing them, was
a savings of $8 million. The cost of concealing them and getting caught,
when compared to disclosing the documents, was only $325,000,
because the company would have been liable for the substantive claims
under either scenario. Therefore, there was a very htigh potential payoff
and a relatively low marginal cost for concealing the documents.
Not only was the sanction insufficient to deter such economically-
motivated behavior, it also allowed both Fisons and Bogle & Gates to
profit from the abuse, despite the fact that the supreme court expressly
directed the trial court to ensure that the wrongdoer; not profit from the
wrong. At a minimum, the trial court should have required the drug
company to disgorge the profits it earned from the continued sale of
theophylline without warning labels."' The court should have required
Bogle & Gates to disgorge the profit it earned from the discovery abuse
as well.
52
Second, neither the supreme court nor the trial court on remand
attempted to punish Bogle & Gates for its conduct. Evidence suggests
that Bogle & Gates's attorneys may have violated the Rules of
Professional Conduct (RPC). Yet neither court referred the case to the
Washington State Bar Association for disciplinary procedures. The court
150. This theoretical analysis assumes, of course, that the lawyer and the litigant are motivated
solely by economic costs and benefits. Although this would rarely be the case in the real world, and
was probably not the case in Fisons, the analysis does shed light on the economic incentives to abuse
discovery.
151. After the trial court ordered the evidence to be sent to the FDA, which in turn mandated
warning labels, sales of theophylline fell by 25%. From this we can infer that the company's
theophylline earnings were 25% higher during the time Fisons was hiding the document than they
would have been if it had been produced. The court should have required Fisons to disgorge these
extra earnings.
152. The sanction should have at least required Bogle & Gates to disgorge the profit it earned





also could have referred to the firm" and the offending attorneys by
name in its opinion. 54
Third, the sanction imposed by the trial court does not educate
practitioners about the discovery requirements. The supreme court
encouraged the trial court to direct payment of monetary awards to a
court fund. This fund could have subsidized Continuing Legal Education
programs for lawyers. The fund could also have supported Washington
State Bar Association efforts to combat discovery abuse. The court
could have required that a certain portion of the sanction 5 5 serve these
purposes, but failed to do so.
3. This Type of Discovery Abuse Will Continue Until Judges Become
Better Equipped and More Determined To Detect It and Enforce
the Rules Consistently.
Deterrence of discovery abuse not only requires the imposition of
meaningful and consistent sanctions when parties are caught, but it also
requires a system to detect abuse. Although the court encouraged trial
judges to impose sanctions, it failed to give guidance about improving
detection of abusers. Although this is a difficult problem to resolve,
detection can be improved by educating judges about the requirements of
Rule 26(g) and committing adequate resources to monitor discovery in
large cases.
Judges must be educated about the requirements of the rule. Before
the supreme court ruled in Fisons, judges either misunderstood the rule
or mistakenly thought that its enforcement was discretionary. For
example, in Fisons, two trial judges and a discovery master concluded
that Fisons had not broken the rules. Given the especially egregious
nature of Fisons's discovery tactics, it is difficult to imagine what type of
abuse would have warranted sanctions by the lower courts. Although the
supreme court's opinion sensitized judges to the requirements of Rule
26(g), it is critical that judges use their sanctioning power consistently.
Active judicial involvement in discovery is a prerequisite to consistent
enforcement of the rules. Although judges can impose sanctions sua
153. The firm is identified in the opinion as defense counsel in the case, but is named nowhere
else.
154. It can be argued, however, that the law firm suffered amply from the bad publicity it received
during this case.
155. An appropriate portion would have been the amount that remained after all aggrieved parties
were compensated.
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sponte, they cannot do so if they do not know about the abuse. When the
discovery abuse consists of evasive and misleading tactics, as in Fisons,
it is difficult for even opposing counsel to know that something is awry.
Therefore, judges should hold regular discovery conferences in large
cases where discovery abuse is most likely to happen. Requiring parties
to meet with the judge or discovery master throughout discovery might
deter abuse by increasing the fear of detection. Although increased
monitoring of discovery would require additional resources, Fisons
illustrates that this action is necessary.
Although it is clear that the imposition of sanctions is a "difficult and
disagreeable task"'5 6 for trial judges, the supreme court's efforts in
Fisons will have been in vain if trial courts do not impose sanctions
every time they are warranted. Fisons will ring as hollow as every other
landmark discovery abuse decision over the past 50 years if it does not
compel trial judges to enforce the rules.
C. Therefore, To Deter Discovery Abuse, the Court Should Explain the
Legal Standard and Direct Trial Courts To Impose Severe and
Consistent Sanctions
The court should take several steps to clarify the legal standard of
Rule 26(g). First, the court should define the boundaries of the
reasonable inquiry requirement of Rule 26(g). Second, the court should
explicitly state that, when justice requires it, the duty to the court to
cooperate in liberal discovery will trump the client's interests. Third, the
court should clarify whether the responding party is now required to err
on the side of disclosure when interpreting all discovery requests.
To help deter discovery abuse, the court should ensure that sanctions
are severe and are imposed consistently. Sanctions must fully
compensate the parties who have been injured by the discovery abuse,
while punishing the abuse, deterring others, and educating the legal
community.
V. CONCLUSION
Although Fisons sends a message that evasive arid misleading tactics
will not be tolerated in discovery, the decision fails to precisely outline
an attorney's duties in discovery. The case also fails to set a precedent
for severe sanctions for egregious discovery abuse. Given the
156. 122 Wash. 2d at 355, 858 P.2d at 1084.
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compelling economic incentive to abuse discovery, the court must take
additional decisive steps to define and enforce the rules if Fisons's
legacy is to endure.
